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 اﻟﺨﻼﺻــﺔ
ﺑﺎﻹﺿﺎﻓﺔ إﻟﻰ ﻣﻮﺿﻮع اﻷرض ﻓﺈن ﻣﻮﺿﻮع اﻟﻤﻴﺎﻩ ﻳﻌﺘﺒﺮ ﻣﻦ اﻷﻋﻤﺪة اﻟﺮﺋﻴﺴﻴﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻣﻔﺎوﺿﺎت اﻟﺴﻼم 
إن ﻣﻌﺪﻻت . ﻧﻪ ﻻ ﻳﻤﻜﻦ أن ﻧﺘﻮﺻﻞ إﻟﻰ دوﻟﺔ ﻓﻠﺴﻄﻴﻨﻴﺔ ﻗﺎﺑﻠﺔ ﻟﻠﺤﻴﺎة ﺑﺪون اﻟﻤﻴﺎﻩإ ﺣﻴﺚ ،ﻣﻊ اﻻﺳﺮاﺋﻴﻠﻴﻦ
  .اﺳﺘﻬﻼك اﻟﻔﺮد اﻟﻔﻠﺴﻄﻴﻨﻲ ﻟﻠﻤﻴﺎﻩ ﺗﻌﺪ ﻣﻦ اﻷآﺜﺮ اﻧﺨﻔﺎﺿًﺎ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻌﺎﻟﻢ
. ﺳﺘﺤﺎول هﺬﻩ اﻟﻮرﻗﺔ ﺗﺤﺪﻳﺪ إﻃﺎر ﻣﻨﺎﺳﺐ ﻹدارة ﻣﺼﺎدر اﻟﻤﻴﺎﻩ اﻟﻤﺸﺘﺮآﺔ ﺑﻴﻦ ﻓﻠﺴﻄﻴﻦ واﻻﺳﺮاﺋﻴﻠﻴﻦو
  ،ﻣﺆﺳﺴﻴﺔ واﻗﺘﺼﺎدﻳﺔ وأﺧﺮى اﺟﺘﻤﺎﻋﻴﺔوﻗﺎﻧﻮﻧﻴﺔ، وﺑﻌﺎد هﻴﺪروﻟﻮﺟﻴﺔ، أﻟﻤﺼﺎدر اﻟﻤﻴﺎﻩ اﻟﻤﺸﺘﺮآﺔ و
  . ﻦ اﻻﻋﺘﺒﺎر ﻋﻨﺪ ﺗﻄﻮﻳﺮ هﺬا اﻹﻃﺎرﻌﻴﺑﺧﺬ ـﺆﺳﺘ  ٌّآﻞو
ﻋﺘﻤﺎد وﺗﻄﺒﻴﻖ اﻟﻘﺎﻧﻮن اﻟﺪوﻟﻲ ﻓﻲ ﺣﻞ اﻟﻨﺰاع اﻟﻘﺎﺋﻢ ﻋﻠﻰ هﺬﻩ اﻟﻤﻴﺎﻩ ﻓﻲ ﺗﺪﻋﻮ هﺬﻩ اﻟﻮرﻗﺔ إﻟﻰ ﺿﺮورة ا
ﻳﻌﺘﺒﺮ اﻟﺘﺤﺪي اﻟﺬي ﻧﻮاﺟﻬﻪ ﻓﻲ هﺬا اﻟﻤﺠﺎل هﻮ آﻴﻒ ﻧﺘﺮﺟﻢ ﻣﺒﺎدئ ﻗﺎﻧﻮن اﻟﻤﻴﺎﻩ إﻟﻰ أﺣﻜﺎم و. اﻟﻤﻔﺎوﺿﺎت
ﺗﺴﺘﺨﺪم هﺬﻩ اﻟﻮرﻗﺔ و. ﺟﻞ اﻟﺘﻮزﻳﻊ اﻟﻌﺎدل واﻟﻤﻨﺼﻒ ﻟﻤﺼﺎدر اﻟﻤﻴﺎﻩ اﻟﻤﺸﺘﺮآﺔأوإﺟﺮاءات ﺗﺸﻐﻴﻠﻴﺔ ﻣﻦ 
ﻠﻰ أدوات ﺻﻨﻊ اﻟﻘﺮار ﺑﺎﺳﺘﺨﺪام اﻟﻤﻌﺎﻳﻴﺮ اﻟﺘﻌﺪدﻳﺔ ﻟﺘﺤﺪﻳﺪ اﻟﺤﺼﺺ ﻓﻲ ﻣﺼﺎدر اﻟﻤﻴﺎﻩ  ﻋًﺎﻣﺒﻨﻴﻋﻤﻠﻴًﺎ أﺳﻠﻮﺑﺎ 
  ﻲـﺎﻩ هـﺺ ﻓﻲ هﺬﻩ اﻟﻤﻴـن اﻟﺤﺼأﺔ ـ ﺧﺮج ﺑﻨﺘﻴﺠ ٍ رﻳﺎﺿﻲ ٍﻮذجــﺮ ﻧﻤـــﻢ ﺗﻄﻮﻳـﺪ ﺗـــﻗو. ﺔــاﻟﻤﺸﺘﺮآ
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ABSTRACT 
Next to issues of land, water resources are the major bone of contention in the peace 
negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. Per capita annual renewable 
freshwater resources in the region are among the lowest in the world. This paper will 
attempt to identify an appropriate framework for management of shared aquifers 
underlying Israel and West Bank that comprise hydrological, legal, institutional, and 
socio-economic and environmental issues. The article calls for the application of 
international water law in the resolution of water disputes in the negotiating process. 
The challenging task for negotiators is to translate water law principles into operating 
rules and procedures for the equitable apportionment of waters from shared water 
resources. The paper introduces a multi-criteria decision tool as a possible approach to 
the problem of allocating the waters of the Mountain Aquifer between all riparian 
parties. A general mathematical model was derived in which the proportional 
entitlements of the Mountain Aquifer were determined. The model yields the following 
results (40%, 60%) where 40% represents the Israeli and 60% the Palestinian 
entitlements. 
Key words: Equitable allocation, transboundary waters, groundwater basins, hydro-
politics, Palestinian-Israeli water conflict, water conflict, multi criteria 
decision tool. 
Classification: Civil Engineering, Water Resource 
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MANAGEMENT OF SHARED AQUIFER SYSTEMS: A CASE STUDY 
BACKGROUND 
Shared fresh water resources 
have been the source of 
international friction and 
tension for many years in many 
places. World-wide, approxi-
mately fifty percent of all land 
area is contained within 
international drainage basins, 
and more than 200 rivers are 
shared by two or more nations. 
These geographical facts have 
led to the geopolitical reality of 
disputes over shared inter-
national rivers and aquifers. 
Shared water resources are 
especially strong sources of 
conflict in the Middle East 
particularly the Jordan River 
shared by Israel, Jordan, 
Palestine (West Bank and 
Gaza), Syria and Lebanon and 
the shared aquifers between 
Palestine and Israel (Mountain 
Aquifer and the Gaza Coastal 
Aquifer) (Figure 1). In the 
Middle East, water has been the 
root, means, and cause of war. 
The control and allocation of 
water has evolved into an issue 
of “high politics,” and it has 
been explicitly made a part of 
the ongoing peace negotiations 
[1]. 
Shortage of water is among 
the most serious problems 
facing the Israel–Palestinian 
region. It is possibly one of the 
most intractable issues of the 
multidimensional dispute 
between Israel and the current 
precursors of the Palestinian 
State. The region has one of the 
smallest annual per capita 
renewable water resources in 
Figure 1. Shared aquifers between Palestine and Israel 
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the world. Water scarcity has always been the dominant factor in populations of the Middle East. The climate of the 
Israeli–Palestinian area west of the Jordan–Dead Sea trough is strongly affected by the desert regions to the south and 
east. Approximately 60 percent of that area is categorized as arid or semi-arid. Average annual rainfall ranging from 
400 to 800 mm in the northern and western part of the area, and sharply declining to the south and east, occurs mainly 
between November and March. The remainder of the year endures a hot dry season with practically no significant 
rainfall. Under such circumstances, conflict about the division of the scant water resources of the region is second or 
equal to the territorial dispute between Israel and the emerging Palestinian State. This is particularly true considering the 
glaring differences between the annual per capita water consumption in the Israeli and the Palestinian sectors. 
Lack of appropriate cooperation and coordination for shared water resources at regional and interregional levels is a 
source of concern.  This issue is highly affected by the prevailing political situation in the region, as well as within 
adjacent regions. Mutual cooperation and coordination in managing the shared surface and groundwater basins would 
help to achieve sustainable development within the region. It is therefore vital that the Israelis and Palestinians attempts 
to improve cooperation regarding shared water development and management. A cooperation mechanism must be 
developed to reach an equitable development and management of their shared waters. An essential requirement for this 
cooperation is a legal regime or framework. This must be developed soon. A balanced legal framework for such 
cooperation, if developed and adopted, will greatly facilitate the development of cooperation agreements and thus help 
sustainable development of the shared water resources. 
Unless both sides cooperate and jointly manage their shared water they both stand to lose, in terms of the long-term 
viability of their water systems. In other words, the only real choice both sides face is between a lose–lose situation if 
they do not cooperate, and a potential win–win situation if they do. This paper will attempt to identify an appropriate 
framework for management of shared aquifers underlying Israel and West Bank that comprise hydrological, legal, 
institutional, and socio-economic and environmental issues. 
MANAGEMENT OF SHARED AQUIFERS 
Framework for management of shared aquifers should comprise institutional, socio-economic, hydrological, legal, and 
environmental issues. 
Institutional Aspects 
In the absence of institutional arrangements for shared aquifer systems, countries sharing one or more aquifers are 
encouraged to forge international cooperation in the management of such groundwater basins by establishing 
commissions or other frameworks, through an appropriate legal instruments. Such frameworks can be derived from 
international treaties and agreements or local legislations and practices or both. Harmonized legislation can play an 
effective role in achieving inter-governmental cooperation. Current trends in national legislations for the management of 
aquifer systems suggest that harmonization could take place with respect to: status of groundwater ownership, regulation 
of drilling and abstraction including groundwater mining, protection and pollution control measures, and user 
participation in decision making. In essence, there is a need for coordination to regulate abstractions and minimize 
mutual harms arising from competitive pumping of shared aquifers, regardless of the magnitude of recharge to an 
aquifer. It is believed that the current use of the Western Aquifer Basin causes a lot of harm to the Palestinians and it is 
critical that appropriate institutions be created to implement the equitable and reasonable utilization of this source of 
water. 
Socio-Economic Aspects 
Water resources have strategic importance for socio-economic and agricultural development, improved welfare and 
public health, alleviation of poverty and improved food security. Growing pressure and lack of coordinated management 
of shared water and related land resources can result in loss of water resources, productive land and life-supporting 
eco-systems. In the absence of joint management there is risk of high social and economic costs and loss of resources 
and benefits. On the other hand, joint management should lead to identification of mutual opportunities for development 
and investments for socio-economic development with poverty alleviation, based on efficient and equitable utilization of 
shared water. 
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Environmental Aspects 
Excessive pumping or mining of shared aquifers can cause adverse environmental impacts and harm all sharing parties 
by causing costly drop of water levels and possible water quality deterioration. Thus, growing dependence on shared 
water with lack of joint management of the shared water aquifers can result in loss of water resources, productive land 
and life-supporting ecosystems. In order to minimize environmental risk, and threats to terrestrial and freshwater 
ecosystems, operational Environmental Impact Assessment procedures for protection and monitoring of shared water 
should be developed and applied. 
Hydrological Aspects 
Sound management of groundwater resources clearly requires a thorough understanding of the hydrogeology of 
aquifers under consideration. Therefore, a unified and consistent knowledge base is a prerequisite for the management of 
shared aquifers. Without knowledge base one cannot estimate the resources of shared aquifers and assign resources 
between countries. The following data was extracted from either Israeli or Palestinian studies. 
About one-third of Israel’s water consumption, some 600 million m3/year, of water is produced from the Upper 
Cretaceous aquifers (often referred to as the Mountain Aquifer). Groundwater recharged along the high ridges of the 
anticlinorial axis diverge into three directions along the structural slopes: to the west (so called Western Basin Aquifer) 
towards the Coastal Plain, to the east (so called Eastern Basin) towards the Jordan–Dead Sea trough, and to the north 
(so called Northeastern Basin) draining towards Valley of Jezreel. Groundwater flows from the recharge areas along the 
high ridges populated by the Palestinians across the 1967 “green line” boundaries into Israel. Groundwater in the three 
basins will be considered a transboundary water resource between Israel and the future Palestinian State, and in the light 
of general scarcity of water resources in the region, will be subject to contentious negotiations. 
Groundwater resources of the main aquifers and basins juxtaposed against the overall consumption are shown in 
Table 1. The 6000 km2 Western Mountain Basin extends from the Judean Desert northward to the Carmel Mountain 
foothills, and from near the center of the Mountain Belt westward to the Coastal Plain. The basin is underlain by a thick 
sequence of layered limestone, dolomite, chert, chalk, and marls of the Eocenian age, and the Upper Cretaceous Judea, 
and Mount Scopus Groups. Over a small percentage of the area in the west, these units are overlain by sand, gravel, and 
conglomerate of the Quaternary Kukar Group [2]. 
Table 1. Groundwater Resources and Overall Water Consumption [2] 
(in million m3/year). 
Water Resources 
Annual 
Recharge 
Israeli 
Consumption 
Settlements’ 
Consumption 
Palestinian 
Consumption 
Total Water 
Consumption 
Western Basin  366 344 10 22 376 
North Eastern Basin 145 103 5 30 138 
Eastern Basin 172 40 35–50 69 144–159 
Gaza Coastal Aquifer 55 0 5–10 110 115–120 
Precipitation recharges the groundwater system at an average volume of 366 million m3/yr, along the crests of the 
Anticlinorium territory, which is the central axis of the Mountain Belt, populated traditionally by an overwhelmingly 
Palestinian majority. Groundwater flows from the recharge zones in a general westward and northward direction across 
the pre-1967 border toward Ras Elain and Timsah (Taninim) Springs, and well fields along the western edge of the basin 
in Israel. Groundwater is the principal source of freshwater and is supplied to wells and springs through fractures and 
caverns in two principal aquifers: the Turonian–Cenomanian age aquifer and the deeper Albian age (Lower Cretaceous) 
aquifer. 
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The Northeastern Basin is the northernmost part of the Mountain Belt delimited geomorphologically by the Valley of 
Jezreel. The basin covers an area of about 1044 km2, and is underlain by a thick sequence of layered limestone, dolomite, 
chert, chalk, and marl of the Eocenian age Advat, and the Upper Cretaceous Judea and Mount Scopus Groups. 
Groundwater is recharged by precipitation at an average volume of 145 million m3/yr along the northern end of the 
Anticlinorium region, which is populated traditionally by an overwhelmingly Palestinian majority and flows generally in 
a northeast direction across the pre-1967 Israeli border. Groundwater is supplied to wells and springs by two principal 
aquifers: the Eocene aquifer and the Turonian–Cenomanian aquifer. 
The Eastern Mountain Basin covers an area of about 3080 km2 and includes the eastern part of the Mountain Belt and 
the steep Western Escarpment of the Jordan Rift Valley. Its entire area is within the West Bank territory, except for a 
sliver of 50 km2 in Israel. The Jordan Rift Valley forms the eastern boundary of the basin. Groundwater is recharged by 
precipitation at an average volume of 172 million m3/yr and flows generally in a southeastward direction toward the 
Jordan Rift Valley. Groundwater is the principal source of freshwater in the basin and is supplied to wells and springs by 
three principal aquifers: the Turonian aquifer, the Upper Cenomanian aquifer and the Lower Cenomanian aquifer [2]. 
Legal Aspects 
International water law and international institutions must play a leading role in solving water conflicts and reducing 
the associated risks of conflict. International water law may be the acceptable basis of an agreement for the riparian of 
any basin. 
In 1966, the International Law Association (ILA) adopted the Helsinki Rules on the Uses of International Waters of 
International Rivers; the set of articles represented one of the earliest attempts at codifying customary international law 
pertaining to transboundary water resources. In 1991, the International Law Commission (ILC), an organization created 
by the United Nations, developed the Helsinki Rules and completed the drafting and provisional adoption of 32 articles 
on the law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses. In 1997, the United Nations General Assembly 
adopted a Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses. It was opened for 
signature and ratification for three years. However, the Convention did not acquire the required number of ratifications. 
Until recently, however, international law on the use of shared water resources has largely focused on surface water. 
Matters relating to shared aquifers have been relatively ignored. One reason for the negligence of groundwater is the 
inadequate understanding on the part of decision makers and legislators of the physical interrelationship between surface 
and groundwater resources and of groundwater as an integral part of the hydrologic cycle. Today, most legislators and 
decision-makers continue to regard groundwater sources as distinct from surface water sources with respect to ownership 
and usage. Therefore, they omit this resource from the legal regime of international water law. It follows that the first 
step in the evolution of the legal regime for groundwater is the acknowledgement of the interrelationship between 
surface water resources and groundwater. 
International groundwater law and treaty practice are still young.  There are only a few treaties and agreements that 
contain provisions dealing with groundwater at various multinational levels, namely, continent, region, and catchment 
basin and bilateral levels. Furthermore, there has been no international ruling on groundwater to date. However bodies, 
such as the ILA, are carrying out work. The ILA has produced some useful legal instruments, including the Helsinki 
Rules and the Seoul Rules. In recent decades, the sharing of groundwater resources has received the attention of the 
international community. This attention has resulted in comparatively rapid advances in groundwater law. 
Most notable in the development of international law applicable to groundwater was in 1997 when the United Nations 
General Assembly adopted the Convention on the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses. As a product of 
the United Nations, the Watercourse Convention constitutes the first official codification of international law applicable 
to groundwater resources. The Convention specifically includes groundwater within its scope by defining “watercourse” 
(the unit subject to regulation) as “a system of surface waters and groundwater constituting by virtue of their physical 
relationship a unitary whole and normally flowing into a common terminus.” 
Despite this progressive development, a careful review of the Convention reveals that while the applicable rules and 
norms are reasonably developed, the types of groundwater subject to those norms are limited. In defining a watercourse, 
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the Convention provides strict criteria for determining whether one or another type of groundwater is encompassed by 
the Convention. As will be seen, the Convention fails to account for both the Mountain Aquifer and the Coastal Plain 
Basin. 
The definition provides that only groundwaters that are part of a “system of surface waters and groundwater” and 
“constituting by virtue of their physical relationship a unitary whole” are encompassed by the Convention. This approach 
advocates a unitary or comprehensive management scheme of interconnected surface and groundwater. While self-
limiting, it nonetheless acknowledges the important interrelationship of surface and underground water within the 
hydrologic cycle. When considered in the international context, it appears that for the Convention to apply, it is not 
necessary for a particular aquifer or for an interrelated surface body of water to traverse an international boundary so 
long as the system, or any one of its interrelated components (i.e., an interrelated aquifer or river or lake), traverses or 
flows along an international border. Despite the expanse of the terminology, the definition also imposes very specific 
limitation on the scope of the Convention. In particular, it restricts the Convention only to “systems,” and only to 
systems that have a “physical relationship” between the inter-linked components. 
Based on these criteria, it appears that for an aquifer to be subject to international law, it must be physically related to 
a surface body of water [2]. This is further underscored by the definition, which specifically excludes from the 
Convention groundwater that is unrelated to any surface water. In comments attached to the draft Convention submitted 
to the United Nations, the Convention’s drafters noted that “[i]t follows from the unity of the system that the term 
‘watercourse’ does not include … groundwater … unrelated to any surface water” [3]. This intentional exclusion was 
rationalized on the basis that unrelated groundwater cannot have any untoward effects on any other watercourse [2]. 
Another definitional limitation under the Watercourse Convention lies in the phrase “flowing into a common 
terminus.” The expression was included, in part, to provide a geographic limitation whereby two different watercourses 
connected by a canal could not be regarded as a single watercourse for the purposes of the Convention [3]. When applied 
to groundwater resources, however, the phrase further limits the types of shared groundwater that falls under the scope of 
the Convention. It specifically excludes groundwater flowing to a terminus different than that of hydraulically related 
surface water body. While not necessarily ubiquitous, this scenario is not uncommon. Moreover, the phrase probably 
excludes a single aquifer unrelated to any surface water since the term “common” implies there must be more than one 
water resource whose flow direction is being assessed. 
Considering the above criteria, both the Mountain Aquifer and the Coastal Plain Basin would be excluded from the 
scope of the Watercourse Convention. While the Mountain Aquifer traverses the political border between Israel and the 
Palestinian Territory in the West Bank, it has no physical relationship with any surface body of water, and is, in fact, 
unrelated to any other identifiable water resource. The Mountain Aquifer, therefore, is not part of a “system of surface 
waters and groundwater and does not flow to a terminus common with another water resource.” 
Moreover, the aquifer flows toward three divergent termini — the water in each of the basins flows in a different 
direction — thus further excluding it from the definitional criteria for groundwater encompassed by the Convention. 
Despite the non-applicability of the Watercourse Convention to the Israeli–Palestinian dispute over groundwater 
resources, there are other sources of international law that may provide guidance for addressing the dispute. There are 
now a growing number of examples in which riparian states use the waters of a shared aquifer. From these examples of 
state practice, as well as from generally accepted norms of international water law, concepts can be extrapolated to 
provide guidelines for the use, management, and conservation of shared groundwater resources. Of these guidelines, the 
most notable include the doctrine of hydrological unity, and the principles of equitable and reasonable use, no substantial 
harm, and good faith negotiations. 
The international water law by itself is nonbinding and lacks enforcement mechanisms. This is true, but it may also be 
the “best we have got” as a guide for negotiations and contain “checks and balances” that, if approached in good faith, 
would protect the interests of all parties. Questions remain about the relative importance of these guidelines and means 
of enforcement [4, 5]. In some ways, the more challenging task for negotiators is to translate those guidelines into 
operating rules and procedures to determine the equitable apportionment of waters from shared water resources. 
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The principle of equitable allocation is one of the most important developed by ILA and the Helsinki statements. 
At the same time, it is one of the most difficult to define, given the multitude of variables that should be taken into 
account [1]. The principle of equitable allocation means that each basin state is entitled to a reasonable and equitable 
share in the beneficial use of shared water. “Equitable” does not mean equal use. Rather, it means that a large variety of 
factors, including population, hydrology, climate, existing uses, and so on, must be considered in the allocation of water 
rights. Table 2 lists the diverse factors that the International Law Association associated with equitable water use [3, 6]. 
Table 2. Factors Associated with Equitable Water Use. 
Factor Definition 
F1 The geography of the basin, including in particular the extent of the drainage area in the 
territory of each basin state. 
F2 The hydrology of the basin, including in particular the contribution of water by each basin. 
F3 The climate affecting the basin. 
F4 The past utilization of the waters of the basin, including in particular existing utilization. 
F5 The economic and social needs of each basin state. 
F6 The population dependent on the waters of the basin in each basin State. 
F7 The comparative costs of alternative means of satisfying the economic and social needs of 
each basin states. 
F8 The availability of other resources. 
F9 The degree to which the needs of a basin state may be satisfied, without causing 
appreciable harm and substantial injury to a co-basin state. 
It is to be noted that each factor is not to be considered in isolation, but looked at together with all the other factors, 
without any of them being given priority. This theory neither purports to identify fixed criteria in the sharing of 
international water, nor to protect existing water rights. Rather it aims at establishing a mechanism for cooperation and 
negotiation with a view to reaching an agreement [4]. 
While these guidelines offer a basis of law by which states are to conform their conduct, compliance is often subject to 
state interests and interpretation. What one state may consider equitable and reasonable, another state may think unjust. 
Thus, application of these principles to a specific dispute, such as that between Israel and the Palestinians, is best left to 
an unbiased tribunal or third party. 
AN APPROACH FOR ALLOCATING THE WATERS OF THE MOUNTAIN AQUIFER 
There has been much written in recent years about the application of water law in shared surface water, as well as the 
development of different allocation schemes based on the interpretation of these “laws” or using other criteria. These 
publications include Gleick [1], Caponera [4], Elmusa [5], and Mimi and Swalhi [7]. On the other hand, few have tried to 
apply the water law to shared groundwater, as has Moore [8]. The approach presented here provides one possible 
approach to the problem of allocating the waters of the shared aquifers underlying West Bank and Israel. The approach 
translates the principle of equitable utilization into a set of procedures to determine the riparians’ entitlements to the 
shared Mountain Aquifer. 
The nine equity factors (Table 2) were applied yielding alternative nine equity standards (Table 3). These equity 
standards served as benchmarks against which various possible allocation outcomes were measured. The equity factors 
and the derivation of the equity standards summarized in Table 3 are stated below. 
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It should be emphasized that the particular equity factors used in this research and their derivative allocation standards 
were selected for illustrative purposes only and are not claimed to be exhaustive; as many or as few factors as are 
deemed relevant can be incorporated into the approach. Moreover, the following numerical example is to demonstrate 
the workings of the decision tool. It is not claimed that the entitlements as calculated here are those that should be 
adopted in practice. 
Table 3. Alternative Equity Standards (Share in Percent). 
Equity Standard No. F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 F9 
Palestine Share 89 51 82 18 32 40 96.6 70 32 
Israel Share 11 49 18 82 68 60 3.4 30 68 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Factor F1 - Geography 
The geography of the basin determines the amount of rainfall caught and, consequently, the total volume of ground 
water recharge and presents a measure of the inflow to the aquifers (influenced by such factors as the climate regime, 
topography, geology, soil characteristics, vegetation cover, and drainage network of the catchment). Thus, the proportion 
of the catchment area (feeding area) lying within each state represents only one measure of the inflow to the shared 
aquifers coming from these states. Table 4 presents one estimate of each riparians’ share of the feeding area and the 
equity standard derived from this factor. 
Table 4. Recharge Areas Lying within Israel and West Bank (km2) [2]. 
Aquifer 
Safe yield 
Mcm/y 
Total recharge 
area 
Recharge area 
within Palestine 
Recharge area 
within Israel 
Western Basin  366 1800 1400 400 
North Eastern Basin 145 700 650 50 
Eastern Basin 172 2200 2150 50 
Total 683 4700 4200 500 
F1 Equity Standard (Percent)  100 89 11 
Factor F2 - Hydrology 
The groundwater hydrology of the shared aquifers can be related to the storage area of each aquifer. Table 5 offers one 
estimate of the storage areas’ contribution to the shared aquifers and the equity standard derived from this factor. 
Table 5. Storage Areas Lying within Israel and West Bank (km2) [2]. 
Aquifer 
Safe yield 
Mcm/y 
Total storage 
area 
Storage area 
within Palestine 
Storage area 
within Israel 
Western Basin 366 2500 50 2450 
North Eastern Basin 145 700 650 50 
Eastern Basin 172 1950 1950 0 
Total 683 5150 2650 2500 
F2 Equity Standard (Percent)  100 51 49 
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Factor F3 - Climate 
The climate affecting the basin is related to many climatic factors such as precipitation, evapotranspiration, 
temperature, and humidity that should be considered. In this research precipitation was considered as shown in Table 6 
(other factors could be considered as well). 
Table 6. Average Annual Rainfall over the Shared Aquifers (Mcm/y) [9]. 
Aquifer 
Total rainfall on 
shared aquifer 
Rainfall over 
Palestine 
Rainfall over 
Israel 
Western Basin  1042 761 281 
North Eastern Basin 535 437 98 
Eastern Basin approximation 1122 1020 102 
Total 2699 2218 481 
F3 Equity Standard (Percent)  82 18 
Factor F4 - Utilization 
Israel is currently the dominant user of the waters of the shared aquifers. Table 7 presents the existing utilization of the 
Jordan River basin and the equity standard derived from this factor. 
Table 7. Overall Water Consumption of Shared Water Resources [2]. 
Water Resources 
Israeli 
Consumption 
Settlements’ 
Consumption 
Palestinian 
Consumption 
Total 
consumption 
Western Basin 344 10 22 376 
North Eastern Basin 103 5 30 138 
Eastern Basin 40 50 69 159 
Total 552 121 673 
F4 Equity Standard (Percent) 82 18  
Factor F5 - Economic and Social Needs 
The economic and social needs of Palestinians and Israelis can be quantified by estimating the projected water 
demands form all sources for domestic, industrial, and agricultural sectors for both the two riparians as summarized in 
Table 8. 
Table 8. Projected Water Demands (million m3) [10, 11]. 
 Palestine Israel Total 
Water demand for the year 2025 (million m3) 1290 2800 4090 
F5 Equity standard (Percent) 32 68 100 
Factor F6 - Population 
Palestine and Israel have a high rate of population growth that is likely to intensify freshwater conflicts in the future. 
A much higher population level will inevitably lower per capita water availability, which might exacerbate freshwater 
tensions in the region. Table 9 represents the projected population for both Palestine and Israel and the equity standard 
derived from this factor. 
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Table 9. Projected Population for the Year 2015 (millions) [12]. 
 Palestine Share Israel Share Total 
Population 1998 2.7 6.0 8.7 
Population 2015 5 7.6 12.6 
F6 Equity standard (Percent) 40 60 100 
Factor F7 - Comparative Costs of Alternatives 
Alternative water resources refer specifically to sources such as desalination and imported water that are not presently 
exploited. The impact of these alternatives on the equation of equitable apportionment depends on their availability and 
comparative costs of harnessing them [5]. Both desalination and importation of water could be available alternatives 
since all riparian states have ground brackish water and enjoy sea front on the Mediterranean Sea. Moreover, there are 
numerous schemes that have been proposed for transporting water via pipelines and canals from the “water rich” 
countries in the Middle East like Turkey, to poorly endowed countries. 
The comparative costs are a yardstick of the parties’ ability to harness alternative resources. The party that is more 
capable of paying for water and tapping the desalination option than other riparian states would be entitled to a smaller 
share of the common waters ( just within the confines of this factor). In this research, GDP was taken as measure of 
comparison to reach the equity standard as shown in Table 10. The Palestinians would be entitled to a larger portion of 
the common waters than Israel, proportional to GDP (GDP per capita for Israel is about 28 times higher than Palestine). 
The comparative costs can be restated as the relative ability of the consumer to pay for higher priced alternatives 
supplies such as desalinated water. Based on the present consumer prices in all riparian states as well as on various 
estimates of desalination costs, the following can be inferred. In Israel, desalinated brackish and saline water is 
affordable for municipal use and economic for agriculture, while desalinated seawater is affordable for domestic use and 
may be economical for some crops. Palestinians would be heavily burdened by the costs of desalinated water [13]. 
Table 10. GDP for the Jordan River Basin Riparians (millions U.S. $) [12]. 
 Palestine Share Israel Share Total 
GDP (1998) 3589 100525  
F7 Equity standard (Percent) 96.6 3.4 100 
Factor F8 - Availability of Other Resources 
Renewable water resources, water demands and Water Stress Index (WSI) for Israel and Palestine are presented in 
Table 11. The WSI is the ratio of water withdrawal or demand to water availability. The state that has less WSI would be 
entitled to a smaller share of the common waters ( just within the confines of this factor). Accordingly, Table 11 was 
compiled to obtain the equity standard. 
Table 11. Non-shared Renewable Water Resources and Water Demands for Israel and Palestine [10, 11]. 
 Palestine  Israel 
Total non-shared renewable water resources (million m3) 215 1104 
Water demand for the year 2025 (million m3) 1290 2800 
WSI (for the year 2025) 600 254 
F8 Equity standard (Percent) 70 30 
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Factor F9 - Appreciable Harm 
The words “appreciable harm” have created definitional problems to all riparian states [5]. Goldberg [13] defined 
appreciable harm as the costs that can be objectively measured as result of denial of allocation. The implication of this 
factor is obvious: to achieve equitable division no riparian can deny water to a co-riparian if that denial causes 
appreciable harm. Water must be reallocated to stop the infringement. To assess the significant harm in this research, the 
following statement for the ILC cited in Goldberg [13] may be helpful: “harm must be capable of being established by 
objective evidence. There must be a real impairment of use, i.e. a detrimental impact of some consequence upon, for 
example, public health, industry, property, agriculture, or the environment in the affected state.” In other words, 
appreciable harm can be gauged by its impact on the social, economic, and environmental needs. Accordingly, if the 
appreciable harm factor is broadened to focus on the social and economic needs, it will become effectively identical with 
Factor F5 (economic and social needs) discussed previously. Therefore, Factor F9 (appreciable harm) will have the same 
equity standards derived for Factor F5. 
OPTIMAL ALLOCATION OUTCOME TO THE SHARED GROUND WATER RESOURCES 
It could be argued that the equity factors discussed above should be given greater prominence when determining 
states’ entitlements. But which factors? To answer this question, and to facilitate the development of a realistic weight 
for each factor, a questionnaire has been designed and sent to fifty water experts all over the world together with 
definition of the factors. The water experts, who work in water institutions, universities, and non-governmental 
organizations, include professional economists, irrigation engineers, water resources experts, and lawyers. 
The questionnaire summarized the international water law, the problem, and the approach of the research. The main task 
for the experts was to assign a weight for each of the nine equity factors (the summation of all weights should be one 
hundred). Twenty-nine experts responded and filled the questionnaire. There was no relation between the answers of the 
experts and their geographical location. Table 12 presents the average weight for each equity factor obtained from the 
collected answered questionnaires. 
Returning to the nine alternative equity standards (Table 3), there is no manifestly “best” division of waters; the 
standards do not converge on any one particular allocation outcome. The task, then, was to identify that outcome which 
did the “least upset” to the nine equity standards taken together, i.e. to distinguish an optimal allocation outcome which, 
while not the best when measured against each equity standard in isolation, was the least worst of all outcomes when all 
nine were taken equally into account. 
Each equity standard listed in Table 2 can be written as Fi = (Xi1, Xi 2) that specifies the proportional shares of the 
shared aquifers allocated to the riparians, where i refers to the equity standard, Xi1 represents the Israeli and Xi 2 the 
Palestinian shares. The sum of the two shares equals 100 percent. To illustrate, the first and second alternative equity 
standards can be written respectively as F1 (11, 89) and F2 (49, 51). 
Any allocation outcome can be written as Xj = (X1, X2) that specify the proportional entitlements of the shared aquifers 
allocated to the two riparians, where X1 represents the Israeli and X2 the Palestinian entitlements. The sum of the two 
entitlements equals 100 percent. 
The optimal allocation outcome can be written as Xj*= (X1*, X2*) and can be defined as the one that minimizes the 
square of the summation of the distances (d) measured outward from itself to all equity standards. The objective function 
Table 12. Weight of Alternative Equity Standards 1. 
Equity Factor F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 F9 
Average weight (percent) 16 15 10 16 10 7 14 10 2 
Range 13–17 12–16 12–15 14–18 8–12 8–11 9–15 5–11 1–6 
1 Table compiled by the authors based on the collected questionnaires. 
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was derived (Equation 1) to satisfy the above stated criterion (minimizes the square of the summation of the distances). 
The mathematics of the objective function considered the weight of the equity factors. 
Minimized =
9 2
* 2
1 1
(  )i ij j
i j
W X X
= =
−∑ ∑  (1) 
where: 
i = 1,…9 refers to the equity standards 
j = 1,…2 refers to the riparian countries 
d = square of the summation of the distances between the allocation outcome and the equity standards 
Xj* = the entitlements of the j th country from the shared water (percentage) 
Wi = is the weight of the ith equity factor (percentage) 
Xi j = is the share of the ith equity factor for the j th country (percentage). 
To find the optimal allocation outcome (Xj*) from set of possible allocation outcomes where the objective function has 
its smallest value (i.e. to optimize Equation 1), the point where the first derivative of the equation equals zero was found. 
Accordingly, the first derivative of Equation 1 was found and equaled to zero * 0
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Applying Equation 2 to the Mountain Aquifer and based on Tables 3 and 12, the optimal allocation outcome specifies 
the proportional entitlements of the Jordan River basin waters allocated to the five riparians.  The equation yields the 
following results (40%, 60%) where 40% represents the Israeli and 60% the Palestinian entitlements. 
As noted earlier, the aim of this exercise is not to provide a definitive solution to the question of all riparians’ 
entitlements. Rather, it is to demonstrate a methodology by which such entitlements can be calculated. Ultimately, the 
choice of standards to include is one for the negotiating parties themselves, should they decide to use this decision tool in 
support of their negotiations. In the final analysis it is only through direct negotiation that an eventual agreement can be 
reached and it is not the task of this paper to prejudge the outcome of that process. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The scarcity of water in the Jordan River basin makes water allocation one of the central issues to be resolved in the 
Arab–Israeli conflict. In this basin, the international water laws that regulate riparian rights are not well observed. 
This article calls for the application of the international water law that can play a positive role in the resolution of water 
disputes in the negotiating process. 
The methodological approach presented in this paper may be one way of approaching the problem of water allocations 
of the Mountain Aquifer and hopefully will provide some input into the negotiating process. It may be controversial and 
raise many objections; however, it is presented as food for thought. 
The procedures described in this paper for determining the optimal allocation outcome used nine operational 
definitions of the ILC equity factors; clearly, these definitions were not exhaustive. One of the first tasks for negotiators, 
therefore, is to define and utilize such other factors as are deemed relevant to this particular water sharing problem. 
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Assuming this methodology was adopted as a decision support tool in the context of the Middle East peace process 
negotiations, it would be up to the parties to decide which of the ILC equity factors are applicable to the Mountain 
Aquifer to determine the appropriate utilization of these factors. They may reject any or all the equity standards used in 
this analysis, or include others not considered here. 
REFERENCES 
[1] P. Gleick, “Reducing the Risks of Conflict over Fresh Water Resources in the Middle East”, in Water and Peace in the Middle 
East. ed. J. Issac and H. Shuval. Amsterdam: Elsevier Publishers, 1994. 
[2] Y. Eckstein and G. Eckstein, “Groundwater Resources and International Law in the Middle East Peace Process”, Water 
International, 28 (2003), p. 154. 
[3] UN “Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses”. 
<http://www.thewaterpage.com/UN_Convention_97.html> (July12, 2001). 
[4] D. Caponera, “The Legal Institutional Issues Involved in the Solution of Water Conflicts in the Middle East”, in Water and 
Peace in the Middle East. ed. J. Issac and H. Shuval. Amsterdam: Elsevier Publishers, 1994. 
[5] S. Elmusa, “Towards an Equitable Distribution of the Common Palestinian–Israeli Waters: An International Water Law 
Framework”, in Water and Peace in the Middle East. ed. J. Issac and H. Shuval. Amsterdam: Elsevier Publishers, 1994. 
[6] J. Eaton and D. Eaton, “Water Utilisation in the Yarmouk–Jordan, 1192–1992”, in Water and Peace in the Middle East. 
ed. J. Issac and H. Shuval. Amsterdam: Elsevier Publishers, pp. 93–106. 
[7] Z. Mimi, and B. Sawalhi., “A Decision Tool for Allocating the Waters of the Jordan River Basin Between all Riparian Parties”, 
Water Resources Management, 17 (2003), p. 447. 
[8] J. Moore, “Parting the Waters: Calculating Israeli and Palestinian Entitlements to West Bank Aquifers and the Jordan River 
Basin”, Middle East Policy, 3 (1994), p. 91. 
[9] SUSMAQ: 2003, Technical Note. Rammallah, Palestine. 
[10] ESCWA, Assessment of Legal Aspects of the Management of Shared Water Resources in the ESCWA Region. New York: 
United Nations, 2002, p. 142. 
[11] GTZ: 1996, Middle East Regional Study on Water Supply and Demand Development. Nablus: Al-Najah University Press, 
350 pp. 
[12] World Bank, 2000 World Development Indicators. Washington, DC: The International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, 2000, p. 389. 
[13] D. Goldberg, Projects on International Waterways: Legal Aspects of the Bank’s Policy. Washington, DC: World Bank, 1992, 
p. 230. 
Paper Received 23 November 2004;  Revised 14 March 2006;  Accepted 17 May 2006. 
View publication stats
